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Five recent cases from Illinois,' Mlassachusetts,2 New York,3
and Oregon 4 suggest a study of the relative merits of zoning
ordinances and restrictions in deeds as aids in the control of
community growth. The discussion may perhaps best proceed
by way of a comparison of (a) the uses to which each may be
put, (b) their administrative methods, and (c) the effect of one
upon the other. The decisions just referred to are mainly con-
cerned with this last topic. A few preliminary matters should
first be noticed.
Each device is a negative and supplementary control, serving
mainly to keep the stream of individual initiative in the use of
property to pre-determined channels. Modern city planning,
however, involves much more than either or both of these re-
strictive devices could be made to accomplish. Affirmative com-
pulsion and condemnation proceedings must frequently be re-
sorted to if constructive effects are to be obtained. Especially
is this so in respect to the development of a system of parks,
playgrounds, waterfronts, boulevards and streets; the placement
of institutions; and the location of transportation lines and ter-
minals.
The servitude imposed by contract is older than that created
by legislation. The covenant sued upon in the basic case of
Whatman 'v. Gibso% r was executed in 1799, and its draftsman-
ship indicates that the conveyancers in England had done this
I Gordon v. Caldwell, 235 M11. App. 170 (1924); Mlink-s v. Pond, 158 N. E.
121 (Ill. 1927).
2Vorenberg v. Bunnell, 153 N. E. 884 (Mass. 1920).
3 Forstmann v. Joray Holding Co., 244 N. Y. 22, 154 N. E. 652 (192G).
4 Ludgate v. Somerville, 256 Pac. 1043 (Or. 1927).
9 Simons 196 (1838).
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sort of thing before. Although it has been said that Massachu-
setts enacted a "use" zoning law in 1692,0 and that European
zoning goes back to an 1810 decree of Napoleon while acting as
Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine,7 it is clear that the
zoning ordinance as we know it today first came into general use
in Germany about 1894 and was introduced in England and the
United States about 1909.8
Because critical examinations of the decision in Tulk V. Mox-
hay 9 have given prominence to an effort to preserve a breathing
place in the city of London, we have been apt to assume that the
restrictive covenant is exclusively an urban mechanism. The
zoning ordinance is peculiarly that. It was the chaotic results of
the growth of large cities during the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century that prompted the enactment of such measures.
And the territorial limitations upon municipal legislative capac-
ity prevent their operation in the country, except where extended
by a regional planning enabling act to include the fringe for
a mile or so beyond the city limits or the space between the
corporate units of a great metropolitan district. On the other
hand, the fact that the restrictive covenant depends for its vital-
ity, not upon legislation but upon contract, means that its field of
operation is much more extensive than that of the zoning ordi-
nance. Thus the covenant dealt with in Whatman v. Gibson was
part of a scheme for the development of a cliff-site at a sea-side
resort. Much of the litigation over restrictions in deeds has
been concerned with the surroundings bf country estates. And
it is not uncommon for a contract to restrain the use to be made
of a chattel. 0
THE USES TO WHICH EACH MAY BE PUT
Restrictive covenants function best when they are compre-
hensively worked out in connection with the intelligent planning
either of large subdivisions, such as Roland Park in Baltimore
or the Country Club District in Kansas City, or of proprietary
town-sites such as Longview, Washington. It is sometimes
thought that they can be effectively used only in such virgin
areas. The problem in sections that are already built up and
established is not so much a legal as a practical one. In the
6 HARTMTAN, BULL. No. 21, MASS. FED. PLANNING BOARDS (June, 1927)
7. The statute referred to is Mass. Prov. Laws 1692, c. 23, now Mass.
Gen. Laws (1921) c. 111, § 143.
7 WILLIAmS, THE LAW OF CITY PLANNING AND ZONING (1922) 210, n. 1.
8 WMLTAMS, op. cit. supra note 7, at 218, 265-267; Wells, The Law of
Zoning in Missouri (1926) UNIV. OF Mo. BULL., 34 LAw SEnirSs 5-6.
9 2 Phillips 774 (1848).
10 See Note (1919) 32 HARv. L. REV. 278; (1922) 36 HARV. L. REV. 107;
(1926) 39 HARV. L. REV. 655.
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present degree of mobility of urban population, it is frequently
difficult to locate and effect an agreement among all the owners
of property in a given city neighborhood. The task is easier
when the particular district was once a subdivision whose devel-
opers are still in business and will take the lead. Attorneys often
think, however, that the imposition of new or additional restric-
tions in a built-up section requires a conveyance of the lots to a
common grantee and the writing into the return deeds of the
desired covenants. Unless the local recording act forbids or is
inapplicable, could not this be accomplished as well through a
blanket written contract, descriptive of the lots involved and
the ends in view, containing appropriate mutual undertakings
and signed by all of the owners concerned? Surely a non-resi-
dent owner would suffer less compunction about this transaction
than over parting even momentarily with his title. The sub-
stantive law governing the creation of the servitude would be
satisfied," and effective recording would be a matter of detail.
At best, however, this process would be a patch-work enterprise,
responding only to neighborhood initiative and leaving inevitable
gaps here and there through which undesirable inroads could be
made.
The zoning device went through its experimental stages in
countries without the American doctrine of judicial review of
legislative validity, and came to us without a definite juristic
basis. It is especially interesting, therefore, that Professor
Ernst Freund should say:
"The legal principle of zoning is the idea that there is such a
thing as unfair, illegitimate non-conformity .... The truth often
does not lie along the most obvious lines, and yet practically if
you have to deal with the courts, you have to approach them on
the somewhat obvious lines of thinking to which they are
accustomed. Thus, it was the path of least resistance to link
up the whole matter of zoning with what is called the police
power. .. . But does it define the police power to refer to the
public or the general welfare?" 1-
As a result of the adoption of the "police power" concept, it
was at first necessary for zoning ordinances in the United States,
- There is a split of authority as to -whether restrictions upon the use of
land even have to be in writing. Compare BROWNE, THE STATUTE OP
FRAuDs (5th ed. 1895) § 269 and Giddings, Restctions Upon the Ue of
Land (1892) 5 HARv. L. Ruv. 274, 278. Perhaps the latest decision uphold-
ing an oral agreement of this character is Thornton v. Schobe, 243 Pac.
617 (Colo. 1925), commented upon in (1926) 24 MicH. L. RE%,. 854. See
also (1924) 3 Tnx. L. REv. 101; Note (1925) 38 HAURv. L. tEv. 967.
12 PLANNING PROBLEMS OF Towx, CITY AND R1EGION, BEING THE PROCEED-
INGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CITY PI.NNING (1926) 713.
Professor Freund's discussion is one of the very few critical examinations
of zoning principles and operations.
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if they would safely run the gauntlet of our due process clauses,
to be tied up pretty definitely, in terms at least, with the further-
ance of conventional notions of health and safety.1 No doubt
these are among the most important objectives of zoning. City
planners proceed on the assumption, however, that it is equally
desirable that certain purely economic and aesthetic considera-
tions in city life should be systematically promoted. And these
last two purposes always predominate in every lay discussion
of zoning schemes. Today there is an increasing willingness
upon the part of the courts to recognize, as the Kansas court
said 14 in upholding an ordinance against bill-boards, that "there
is an aesthetic and cultural side of municipal development which
may be fostered within reasonable limitations" by statute. In
the Euclid Village case, 5 the Supreme Court exhibited a psy-
chiatrist's comprehension of the effect of city life upon the tem-
perament of the urban dweller. And a federal District Court
has recently, although reluctantly, upheld as a police measure,
x zoning ordinance designed to prevent the further encroach-
ments of industry upon the environment of a state university
campus. 0
No one seriously contends, however, that zoning legislation
would either be enacted or upheld if it attempted to prescribe
requirements as to the minimum cost or architectural design17
of buildings, or the shape and landscaping of lots. These fac-
fors can be handled only by private contracts.
Racial discriminations in the use and occupation of land can-
not be accomplished through zoning ordinances.", The Fifth
a-d Fourteenth Amendments bar the way. Some think I that
isSee the interesting articles by Larremore, Public Aesthetics (1906) 20
IFA v. L. Rnv. 35, 44; and Baker, Municipal Aesthetics and the Law
(1926) 20 ILL. L. Ray. 546.
24 Ware v. City of Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 157, 214 Pac. 99 (1923).
Oh restrictive covenants against bill-boards, see 41 A. L. R. 756, 760 (1926)
annotation; 2 B. R. C. 425, 434 (1912) annotation. Billboard ordinances
are now widely sustained when couched in terms of safety and fire preven-
tion, Note (1927) 13 VA. L. REV. 581.
IS Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct.
114 (1926).
16 Am. Wood Products Co. v. Minneapolis, 21 F. (2d) 440 (D. Minn. 1927).
31 Bostock v. Sams, 95 Md. 400, 52 Atl. 665 (1902).
"sBuchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 38 Sup. Ct. 16 (1917), commented
-upon in Note (1917) 16 MIcH. L. REv. 109 and Note (1918) 31 HAnv. L.
Ray. 475; Tyler v. Harmon, 158 La. 439, 104 So. 200 (1925); s. c. 160 La.
,943, 107 So. 704 (1926), r'ev'd 273 U. S. 668, 47 Sup Ct. 471 (1927);
Land Development Co. v. New Orleans, 13 F. (2d) 898 (E. D. La. 1926),
rev'd 17 F. (2d) 1016 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927). For the diversity of opinion
i i the state courts, see Hott, Constitutionality of Municipal Zoning and
-Segregation Ordinances (1927) 33 W. VA. L. Q. 332, 341, and Comment
(1926) 36 YALE LAW JouniqAL 274.
II Bruce, Racial Zoning by Private Contra t in the Light of the Constitu-
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the Supreme Court, in Corrigan v. Bucklcy, 0 upheld the use of
restrictive covenants which had that purpose. The restrictions
there presented recited that the lots involved were never to be
used or occupied by, or sold, leased or given to persons of the
negro race. An attempted sale to a negro was enjoined below.
The Supreme Court of the United States dismissed an appeal
for want of jurisdiction. Obviously, neither the Fifth, Thi-
teenth nor Fourteenth Amendments prohibits racially discrinin-
atory private contracts. Whether these violated some public
policy found in the general or common law of the District of
Columbia or were of such a character that a court of equity
ought not to lend itself to their enforcement imolved no statu-
tory or constitutional question sufficient of itself to confer jur-
isdiction. And the contention that the decree of the court below
enforcing the restrictions amounted to a governmental depriva-
tion of property within the purview of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments, although not properly raised, was dismissed as
"likewise lacking in substance." The court said:
"The defendants were given a full hearing in both courts; they
were not denied any constitutional or statutory right; and there
is no semblance of ground for any contention that the decrees
were so plainly arbitrary and contrary to law as to be acts of
mere spoliation. Mere error of a court, if any there be, in ajudgment entered after full hearing, does not constitute a denial
of due process." 21
It might be urged that a common law rule, when sanctioned
by a state court, may be just as offensive to constitutional
prohibitions as a similarly designed statute.22  The answer
is that the making of the discriminatory restrictions was
not required by any rule or policy of the District of Columbia.
The restraints of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are
directed to coercive policies formulated by the government,
whether judge-made or legislated, and not to voluntary undertak-
ings. Nor does it suffice to say that the private act of discrim-
ination would be ineffective without the court's aid, unless, per-
haps, in enforcing the covenant, the court overrides a locally
established general policy or rule to the contrary and thus gives
color to the claim that it is motivated by race prejudice.23 If it
be conceded that an appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction
tions and the Rule Against Restraints on Alienation (1927) 21 ILL. L. R L-.
704, 711.
20 271 U. S. 323, 46 Sup. Ct. 521 (1926).
21 Ibid. 331, 46 Sup. Ct. 524.
22 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U. S. 406, 410,
417, 31 Sup. Ct. 59, 62 (1910) ; Dodd, Impairment of Obligation of Contract.
by State Judicial Decision (1909) 4 ILL. L. Rrhv. 155, 327.
23 (1926) 35 YALE LAW JOURNAL 755.
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strictly decides nothing, the demonstrated attitude of the court
at least serves to indicate what its reaction is likely to be when
the question is properly raised. The present tendency of the
state courts on the constitutional issues is overwhelmingly in
favor ofvalidity.24 None of the opinions, however, seem to have
adequately considered the effect of the decree as a possible denial
of due process.
Nor do the state courts appear to doubt the reasonableness
of racial segregation as a privately initiated policy, when mo-
tivated by the more commonly felt racial antipathies. While
the New Jersey court in a dictum has said that it would refuse
to enforce a restriction against ownership or occupation by per-
sons of the Jewish faith,25 covenants drafted clearly against use
or occupation by negroes, Chinese or Japanese, and limited in
duration to say twenty-five years, would probably be upheld
everywhere. The time limit itself is perhaps not significant but
it does become important on the issue of reasonableness when
the case is presented to the court. If the covenant goes further,
however, and seeks to prohibit the sale, lease or gift to similar
classes, it may be endangered by the policy or rule against re-
straints upon alienation. Upon that question the courts are
divided. 26 The excellent discussions of this aspect of the problem
in the periodicals listed in the above note make additional com-
ment unnecessary. It is doubtful, however, if any court will
follow the Virginia decision in People's, Pleasure Park v. Roh-
leder,27 which found no violation of a restriction against transfer
to negroes in a sale to a corporation composed of negroes, even
though it was formed to operate an amusement park for colored
people upon the land in question. The refusal of the federal
District Court in California to allow violators of the alien land
law of that state to hide behind a corporate entity 25 seems more
sensible. Much can be accomplished in these fields through in-
direction. For example, in connection with the management of
co-operative apartments, provisions are common reserving to
the promotors or an association of owners, the "first refusal" 29
in case of a proposed sale.
24 See the materials referred to infra note 26.
25 Miller v. Jersey Coast Resorts Corp., 130 Atl. 824, 828 (N. J. Eq. 1925).
26 Bruce, loc. cit. supra note 19; (1926) 35 YALE LAW JOURNAL 755;
Note (1926) 24 MICH. L. REv. 840; (1926) 20 ILL. L. REV. 723; (1926)
21 ILL. L. REV. 78; (1926) 14 CALIF. L. Rsv. 503; (1927) 12 CORN. L. Q.
400; 42 A. L. R. 1273 (1926) annotation.
27 109 Va. 439, 61 S. E. 794 (1908).
28 Frick v. Webb, 281 Fed. 407 (N. D. Cal. 1922) ; of. Willmott v. London
Road Car Co. [1910] 2 Ch. 525.
29 Care should be taken that this privilege is definitely related to an
ascertainable price. See Manchester Ship Canal Co. v. Manchester
Racecourse Co. [1901] 2 Ch. 37; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) §§ 43, 61;
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On the uses to which zoning ordinances and restrictions in
deeds may be put, it may perhaps be concluded that subject to
the practical difficulties already mentioned and others to be dis-
cussed in the next section, the scope of the restrictive covenant's
potential operation is broad enought to permit its use for every
purpose attainable by a zoning ordinance. That is to say, it
may serve to regulate matters of height, area and bull, courts
and yards, set-backs, and use. In addition, it may be resorted
to for the protection of such subjects as cost and beautification,
and to a certain extent, race prejudice.
THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE METHODS
A number of interesting and apparently significant compari-
sons can be made of the administrative methods peculiar to each
of the devices under consideration. One must, however, keep
two or three inherent distinctions constantly in mind.
Most of the nearly six hundred American cities now subject to
zoning legislation 3o have adopted their ordinances witlhin the
last decade. Zoning is still in its infancy and most persons con-
cerned therewith are largely feeling their way. The public has
been converted to the general principle of zoning, and critical
reactions are just beginning as to its detailed aspects. This
means that confusion abounds in what is really a period of ad-
justment. There is as yet no settled administrative technique or
procedure. On the other hand, after more than a century of
litigation in the private restriction field, courts know pretty well
how to handle the enforcement of the covenant.
Except where tentative or preliminary zoning is applied in
spots pending the completion of the whole plan, zoning is city-
wide. Restrictions in deeds are always sectional. Most sub-
divisions have been laid out with little thought of their relation
to the community at large. In many instances there has been
not even an adequate coupling of the layout of streets, alleys
and utility services with that of the city. The developers have
been actuated by a desire to sell the lots as quickly and at as
large a profit as possible, going only so far with restrictions as
will not impair these objectives. Only a few have exhibited the
degree of foresight and civic consciousness felt by the designers
Fogg v. Price, 145 Mass. 513, 14 N. E. 741 (1888) ; Hayes v. O'Brien, 149
Ill. 403, 37 N. E. 73 (1894) ; Monroe v. Crabtree, 178 Iovwa 540, 159 N. W.
979 (1916).
so The Division of Building and Housing of the U. S. Department of
Commerce publishes excellent source-materials for the study of zoning. See
particularly, A CITY PLANNING PRIMER (Feb., 1927); ZONING Paarxss n-;
THE UNITED STATES (July, 1927); A STANIDA STATE ZONING ENABLING
AcT (1926); and A STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACr (Feb., 1927).
Consult, also, the materials referred to supra notes 7 and 12.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
of such tracts as Roland Park (Baltimore), the Country Club
District (Kansas City) and Mariemont (Cincinnati). Indeed,
in some of these latter areas, the covenants accomplish for the
contemplated community a program similar in some respects
to that usually aimed at by zoning ordinances: creating districts
for business, parks, playgrounds, schools, libraries and resi-
dences, and dedicating streets and alleys.
Zoning by ordinance is undertaken, ostensibly, only in the
interest of the city as a whole. Whether this is in fact true
depends entirely upon the way in which the work is done. Its
excellence inevitably varies with the standards of the local gov-
ernment generally and with the personnel, industry and courage
of the bodies directly in charge. Charges are heard now and
then that in given localities the zoning device has been or is
likely to be used as an artificial stimulus for the inflation in value
of a tract controlled by an influential group. More often the
charge is that it is resorted to for the protection of already
established institutions or investments. In other words, the
political situation is an important factor here. It seldom is so in
connection with private restrictions.
The chancellor, of course, is never a party to the creation of
the contract he is asked to enforce. In zoning, the city is the
creator 31 of the restrictions. The principal zoning administra-
tors, the building commissioner and board of zoning appeals, fol-
low in the wake of the city planning commission which laid out
the scheme and the city council which enacted it into law. The
survey which preceded the plan is in their hands, as are the
ordinances, maps, data and detail. On the other hand, the chan-
cellor gets his knowledge of the purport, background and effects
of the covenant from evidence introduced in court in the time-
honored fashion. As a board, the board of zoning appeals is
a specialized agency. The court is charged with a thousand other
and unrelated matters. The occasional request for an injunction
to prevent the disruption of a restrictive covenant is just one
case on the docket. But the court is, presumably, a qualified
expert in judicial administration. The building commissioner
has many other duties not related to zoning. And the city offi-
cials and citizens on the board of appeals or plan commission
,are, as to this function, amateurs. As heads of city depart-
ments, or as bankers, lawyers and merchants, their main inter-
ests are far afield.
The canons of construction require the court to read the deed
restrictions strictly against their proponent and in favor of the
31 Where "excess condemnation" is permitted, the city imposes deed
restrictions upon land surrounding public improvements. See article by
Dodd and Britton in ILL. CONST. CONY. BULL. (1920) 491-493.
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free use of land.32 The building commissioner, in applying the
zoning ordinance in the first instance, is without discretion. The
commission or board of appeals, however, looks to the underlying
spirit as governing literal interpretation of the legislation. This
body has a discretionary power to modify or vary the require-
ments of the ordinance to prevent unnecessary hardship upon
the owners of unstandardized properties. Its function is the
adjustment of the plan of the ordinance to specific situations
where a literal enforcement would involve practical difficulties or
inequitable consequences. Ordinances without such a "safety
valve" have sometimes been held unconstitutional as providing
no guaranty of reasonableness in application. No adequate study
has been made of these administrative agencies. A recently pub-
lished 33 series of reports shows the following illustrative results
of the work of a few boards of appeal in their first years of ac-
tivity.
During the first three years in Pittsburgh, 4,034 applications
for a variance went to the board of appeals after negative action
by the building permit office. Of these, 1,061 were granted out-
right, and 1,842 granted conditionally. In a similar period in
Kansas City, out of 600 appeals filed, 350 were granted, many
upon conditions. In Providence, during substantially the same
time, 70% out of 213 appeals were sustained. The Boston board
upheld less than 50% of 300 appeals during two and a half years.
The Denver board reversed the permit office in 123 out of 182
cases during the first year's work. The officials claim that this
does not mean that the law is being evaded, nor that it was
badly drawn, but that when a zoning ordinance is applied to an
already established community, a literal enforcement would pro-
duce in many instances a hardship not resulting in corresponding
benefit to the community. For example, the topography in Pitts-
burgh was probably responsible for 2,986 appeals relating al-
most exclusively to the requirements as to area per family and
regulations as to yards. Only one city boasted of the practice of
the board not to attach conditions to the privilege of variation.
Most boards felt proud of their conditional actions as tending
to make permitted non-conforming uses as innocuous as pos-
sible. Thus, in one instance, a bakery, previously established,
desired to complete its unit by an addition in a section zoned
for dwellings. A permit was granted on condition that certain
windows be closed, noiseless bread conveyors and modern ven-
tilating systems installed, and shade trees planted in the yard.
The results of the strict construction attitude of the courts
2 Peterson v. Gales, 210 N. W. 407 (Wis. 1926) ; Miller v. Jersey Coast
Resorts Corp., supra note 25.
33 The Board of Appeals in Zoning, A Symposium, in 3 CITY PLxNo .M;G
(1927) 63-72. BAxEi, TnE LEGAL Asrzcrs OF ZONING (1927), 76-112 is ex-
cellent. Received after press-time.
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toward covenants are not quite the same as those arising from
the administrative attitude toward the restrictions imposed by
ordinance. Under the deed, the owner of the servient estate
is free to use. the land except as prohibited by clearly expressed
language in the deed. Under the zoning plan, the owner may
sometimes use the land for a purpose definitely prohibited by
the ordinance because of the supposed "equities" of his situation.
In other words the zoning mechanism, including as it does the
provision for variances by the board of appeals, expressly ar-
ranges for a greater flexibility in the permitted use of land. The
courts have not attempted, in the absence of statutes, 34 to modify
or vary the effect of restrictive covenants. When, in view of
changed conditions,35 the chancellor has thought that enforce-
ment would not secure to the plaintiff the benefit originally con-
templated, he has virtually cancelled the restrictions by a denial
of relief. Similarly, he has sometimes pronounced them to be at
an end through an application of the so-called "balance of in-
jury" doctrine, when it has appeared that enforcement would do
more harm to the defendant than good to the plaintiff." And in
at least two cases, 37 he has conditioned the decree forbidding a
violation of a covenant against the probable requirements of a
fast approaching change in the neighborhood.
Many complainants have been refused injunctions against pal-
pable violations of private restrictions because of the effect of
delay and inattention thought to be tantamount to acquiescence
or estoppel. 38 It appears to be fatal for a dweller in a privately
restricted neighborhood not to take prompt and diligent action
whenever he sees construction in progress near his home. One
zoning enthusiast has reported that restrictions in deeds are
easily breakable and that zoning ordinances are sometimes neces-
sary to prevent a conspiracy of several lot-owners to acquiesce
in a deliberately planned breach and thus render the major part
of a restricted area available for more profitable use.9 Under
the best modern covenants, provisions are inserted to prevent
84 See infra notes 64-66.
35 See Cowan v. Ferguson, 48 Don. L. R. (Ont. 1919) 616, and the cases
discussed in the following Notes: (1928) 31 =IARv. L. REv. 876; (1926) 74
U. PA. L. REv. 312; (1927) 12 CoRN. L. Q. 518. In Waggoner v. Floral
Hts. Baptist Church, 288 S. W. 129 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926), the restric-
tions had lapsed.
36 Forstmann v. Joray Holding Co., supra note 3, commented upon in
Note (1927) 12 CORN. L. Q. 518. And see Note (1922) 36 -HAUV. L. RBv.
211, 213.
37 Gordon v. Caldwell, supra note 1; Ward v. Prospect Manor Corp., 188
Wis. 534, 206 N. W. 856 (1926).
38 The best collection of these cases is the annotation in 46 A. L. R.
372 (1927).
39 See PROCEEDINGS referred to supra note 12, at 65.
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these consequences, in this manner: Enforcement is to be the
joint responsibility of the individual lot-owner and of the cor-
poration which originally developed the tract or an association
of owners acting through a trustee.3' Failure to object upon the
part of either is not to bar the other, as to the same, prior or
subsequent infractions. Perhaps these clauses vill be held to
waive antecedently any defense normally derivable from delay,
acquiescence or estoppel.
The administration of zoning does not face these weaknesses
of individual enforcement. We have long been used to the neces-
sity for building permits before construction or alteration is be-
gun, and to their refusal if the specifications have not complied
with sanitary and fire regulations, to mention only two. Zoning
begins here, and today the permit is refused if sought for a non-
conforming use or if the proposed structure violates requirements
as to bulk, area or size of yards. If work goes ahead without
a permit, the city may resort to various sanctions. Civil pen-
alties and fines may be recovered or the offender put in jail.
Many laws and ordinances authorize the issuance of an injunc-
tion. Even though that procedure has not been provided by
statute, and in the face of the objection that equity was departing
from its policy of not enforcing the criminal law, the use of the
injunction to prevent violations of the zoning scheme has been
sustained by handling the project as a public nuisance.4 This
presents the interesting picture of the chancellor enforcing both
the private and the legislative restrictions with the same process.
The withholding of the building permit, for a structure of large
size, is usually effective upon public opinion and upon material-
men and contractors.
In a constantly increasing number of cities, there is provision
for an appeal to a group functioning as a board of zoning ap-
peals. Where none is available, and the courts are approached
through mandamus or bill in equity, the questions raised relate
to compliance with the state enabling act,41 and the constitution-
ality of that statute and of the ordinance. The Euclid Villege
case 42 established the judicial attitude toward the general scope
of municipal zoning. And the recent federal District Couit de-
cision in American Wood Pi'oducts Co. v. Minncapolis.4 per San-
3"a Parsons v. Duryea, 158 N. E. 761 (Mas. 1927).
40 City of New Orleans v. Liberty Shop, 157 La. 2G, 101 So. 798 (1924),
40 A. L. R. 1136, 1145 (1926) annotation; Holzbauer v. Ritter, 184 Wis.
35, 198 N. W. 852 (1924). Contra: Coley v. Campbell, 126 Misc. 809, 215
N. Y. Supp. 679 (Sup. Ct. 1926). See (1928) 37 YALE LAW JounNA,, MS7.
4 
'Dart v. City of Gulfport, 113 So. 441 (Miss. 1927).
42 Supra note 15.
42S~pra note 16. See, on judicial review of an amendment by the city
council to cover a specific application, Gorieb v. Fox, 273 U. S. CS7, 47
Sup. Ct. 675 (1927).
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born, J., perhaps goes as far toward a similar view of specific
applications:
"It is evident, however, that zoning ordinances which, in
theory at any rate, are carefully prepared by planning com-
missions and adopted after careful study by city councils, will
not be benefited by having the judges of the federal courts sub-
stitute their judgment for that of the legislative bodies and
attempt to revise them with respect to individual cases." 41
This followed a vigorous criticism by Judge Sanborn of the
policy of the ordinance, under which additions to established
factories were prohibited, as lacking in good sense, common
decency, justice and morals, because it did not provide for com-
pensation.
Speed, informality and publicity characterize the work of the
board of zoning adjustment. One city reports the average time
elapsing between the filing of the appeal and the decision as
from five to ten days. A personal inspection is commonly made,
either by board members or representatives, in advance of the
hearing4' A sign on the property or notices in the newspapers
afford the neighbors an opportunity to attend and to be heard.
Sometimes the demonstrated opposition of a considerable number
of citizens has been enough to cause the withdrawal of the ap-
peal. There are no pleadings, and rules of evidence seem un-
thought of. The board gets information from those interested
upon which to balance the petitioner's need against the require-
ments of the ordinance and the desires of those most immediately
to be affected.
Judicial review of the decisions of boards of zoning appeals
seems to be limited mainly to a test of the fairness of the exer-
cise of administrative discretion.46 It does not extend to a trial
de novo upon the facts. Questions of compliance with state
enabling acts and of constitutionality arise here also. The ap-
pellate review of lower court action in the restrictive covenant
cases differs only as to the nature of the issues upon which the
discretionary function of the chancellor has to work.
Except where the property involved was originally developed
by a company still in business, there is more practical difficulty
in the way of getting restrictions imposed by contract amended
to meet new conditions, than in the creation of new restrictions
in an already established section. In the situation excepted, the
contracts sometimes provide for revision and amendment, at
stated intervals, by coperation between the original developers
44 Supra note 16, at 444.
4 For an instance of personal inspection of an alleged change in the
surroundings of privately restricted land, see Downs v. Xroeger, 254 Pac.
1101 (Cal. 1927).
46 Minkus v. Pond, supra note 1.
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or the maintenance association and a majority of the owners of
lots. In one large city a subdivider is said to have called back
an enormous number of conveyances for the purpose of adding
restrictions thought necessary to block the expected effect of a
proposed zoning ordinance upon that locality. The Texas court
has denied that "amendments" to restrictions can go to the ex-
tent of wiping them out entirely 4 7
The zoning ordinance can, of course, be amended and revised
from time to time by the city legislative body. Some zoning
workers favor the notion that amendments should be initiated,
or at least approved, by the city planning commission or board
of zoning appeals. Others argue for restraints in the form of
three-fourths vote in the city council or the expressed concur-
rence of a certain percentage of adjacent property owners. Pro-
fessor Freund is somewhat pessimistic:
"I receive every week the Bulletin of the Chicago City Council,
with its output of legislation; and there is not a number where
I do not find one or two or three amendments of the zoning
ordinance. In other words, when you cannot get a thing through
your Board of Appeals, you get it through your alderman, and
he gets an amendment to suit the particular need or desire of
his constituent. That seems to me a grave infraction of the
entire principle because it isn't done systematically, but is done
entirely through political influence. I understand that in some
states there is a rule that amendments of the zoning ordinance
can be made only upon recommendation of the Board of Appeals,
but the rule is not absolute because ordinarily there is a provi-
sion that if the Board does not consent, then an increased
majority can amend. This, however, is a very slight safeguard,
as votes in a city council go, and in most cases a four-fifths
majority is as easily obtainable as a bare majority." 4
It seems clear, therefore, that from the standpoint of the re-
spective merits of the two devices as aids in the control of com-
munity growth, the administrative aspects of zoning on the whole
possess more advantages than those incident to restrictions in
deeds; namely, protection for the community as a whole, sys-
tematic control, greater flexibility, and official as against indi-
vidual enforcement.
THE EFCT OF ONE UPON THE OTHER
Zoning programs are frequently influenced by restrictions in
deeds.49 Where a very substantial area has been set aside for a
4 Couch v. So. Meth. University, 290 S. W. 256, 20 (Tex. Civ. App. 192G).
4s Supra note 12.
419 The present writer desires at this point to aclmowledge the help
received from letters sent in answer to his inquiries by Mr. Gordon Whitnall,
Director of the Los Angeles Board of City Planning Commissioners; Mr.
Jacob L. Crane, a town planning engincer of Chicago; Mr. Harland
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high type use through the medium of deed restrictions, and that
area is sufficiently large and geographically distinctive, zoning
officials ordinarily recognize the character of the development
and classify that section accordingly, so that the objectives of the
statutory and deed restrictions are the same. Otherwise, zon-
ing classifications are predicated upon a consistent city-wide
policy and are established, for the most part, independently of
existing restrictions imposed by contract.
Zoning affects restrictions in deeds in five or six ways. The
fear of manipulation of the zoning device for selfish ends has on
occasion caused new or revised restrictive covenants to be en-
tered into respecting the use of land in a given neighborhood.
Sometimes the selfishness has been more apparent on the part of
the covenantors, who by their agreement have sought to block
the expected effects of a really beneficent ordinance, either in
advance of or after its enactment. In the first situation, the
covenant is apt to be more restrictive than the ordinance. The
contrary is the more likely in the second. Some zoning enabling
laws contain a provision to the effect that "the powers by this
act conferred shall not be exercised so as to deprive the owner
of any. existing property of its use or maintenance for the pur-
pose to which it is then lawfully devoted." The Department of
Commerce advises,50 however, that "while the almost universal
practice is to make zoning ordinances non-retroactive, it is recog-
nized that there may arise local conditions of a peculiar character
that make it necessary and desirable to deal with some isolated
case by means of a retroactive provision affecting that case only.
For this reason, it does not seem wise to debar the local legisla-
tive body from dealing with such a situation." There is no rea-
son in the nature of things why a need for such legislation may
not be presented by a restrictive covenant as well as by a tradi-
tional type of affirmative use. The saving clauses of many or-
dinances provide that the zoning ordinance is not intended to
abrogate or supplant restrictions privately imposed, except that
where the legislation lays down the more restrictive require-
ments, those regulations shall control. These provisions were
once more common than they are today. There is no reason why
a zoning ordinance cannot be so referred to in a deed as to be
incorporated therein with the effect of an express covenant. Liti-
gation has arisen as to whether the purport of an ordinance may
not operate as an implied covenant in a deed executed prior to
Bartholomew, Engineer for the City Plan of St. Louis; Mr. Frank R.
Grant, of the J. C. Nichols Investment Co., of Kansas City; Mr. Robert
Whitten, City Planning Consultant, of New York City; and Mr. E. M.
Bassett, Counsel for the New York Zoning Committee.
- A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (1926) 2.
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the ordinance's repeal. 1 Finally, subdivision control by city
planning agencies under the authority of state enabling acts
will go far to insure consistency between contractual and munic-
ipal use regulations, as well as street and utility layouts, in the
future. Approval of plats and restrictions as a condition to re-
cording and transfer will affect new restrictive covenants with-
in the city and, where regional planning is permitted, for a dis-
tance of several miles beyondz2
Where the scope of the zoning regulations is more restrictive
than those of the deeds, no problem is presented different from
that raised by the application of the ordinance generally. That
is, the deeds may say that there shall be nothing but one-family
houses, duplexes and small apartments. The ordinance says
there shall be nothing in that section but one-family homes. The
lot-owner who desires to erect an apartment sees a conflict. The
beneficiaries of the restrictive covenant do not object however,
unless by connivance they are also interested in the overthrow
of the ordinance, for the ordinance goes farther toward protect-
ing them than did the covenant. Presumably the locality is still
largely residential. The deed restriction is not being violated by
the proposed use, even if the ordinance were not present. The
owner's privilege that is cut off by the zoning ordinance was
not derived from the covenant but from ownership generally.
If the reverse is true, and the covenant is more severe than
the ordinance in its restrictions upon private initiative, then an
important and a difficult problem, unique in several aspects, is
presented as to the effect of the zoning legislation upon the en-
forceability of the restrictions in the deeds. For the owner of
the restricted lot is not objecting to the ordinance here; rather he
is relying upon it as freeing him from the control of his neigh-
bors. It is the beneficiary of the restriction who charges confis-
cation pro tanto of his rights if the ordinance is effective to en-
large the privilege of the lot-owmer. It may be, of course, that
no question will arise until the force of the covenant has been
spent, either by lapse according to its terms (restrictions have
usually been imposed for a period of years) or because of a
change in the neighborhood, perhaps brought about by the effects
of the zoning scheme itself. If the question arises sooner, no
opportunity is afforded for a variance or modification to be at-
51 See Note, Zoning Ordinance as Implied Covenant in Dccd (1926) 10
MIARQ. L. REv. 165.
52See A STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING Acm (1927) tit. 2;
Anderson, The Extra-Territorial Pocers of Cities (1926) 10 M!1NN. L.
Rav. 475, 564, 572, reprinted in (1927) 61 AM. L. REV. 641, 680; Root,
Regulation of Land Subdivision, and W"Thitten, Combined Zoning anzd
Planning Control of Unsubdivided Areas, with discussion of both papers, in
PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CITY PLANNING (1926) 49-66.
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lowed by a board of zoning appeals, for it is not the ordinance
that forbids the proposed use but the covenant. The deeds may
confine the use to a single-family house while the ordinance says
that there shall be nothing in this area but one-family homes
and small apartments. Or, the covenant may restrict to business
uses only and provide for a rdversion in the event of any other
use, whereas the ordinance prohibits any use other than resi-
dential53 Again, the ordinance may proceed on the basis of a
taking for a public use with compensation.
Five recent cases from Illinois, Massachusetts, New York and
Oregon agree that the ordinance is to have no effect upon the
deed restrictions where the covenant prescribes residences and
the section is zoned for business or apartments. The ordinance
is construed in these cases to mean that only those otherwise
free may use their properties for the purposes contemplated by
the zoning scheme.54 If it purports to abrogate existing private
restrictions, the courts seem to assume that the ordinance is
unconstitutional,r5 probably because of the due process or im-
pairment of contracts clauses. There is no apparent judicial
inclination to view the zoning ordinance either as expressing a
countervailing public policy or as accelerating the normal growth
and change of conditions in the locality in question. On the con-
trary, when the plaintiffs have built homes in reliance upon the
restricted character of the neighborhood, and they have not
waived or abandoned their rights, the courts find every ingre-
dient in the "public convenience and welfare" calling for a decree
that will maintain their surroundings as originally contemplated.
This is strikingly illustrated in one of the Illinois cases and in
the New York case. In the former,,; it appeared that the plain-
tiff had bought land restricted by covenant for residences and
had erected an expensive break-water, in preparation for an
apartment structure, in reliance upon the zoning commission's
recommendation to the city council that the area be zoned for
apartments. The council rejected this and zoned the lots for
residences only, in accordance with the deed restrictions, al-
though this section was the only spot on a long stretch of Chica-
go's north shore that had not been developed and subsequently
zoned for apartments. The court sustained the board of zoning
appeals in its refusal to permit a variance. In the New York
case,57 a beneficiary of a deed restriction for residences sought
s Such a problem was reported from Los Angeles. It has not reached
the litigation stage, apparently.
54 Gordon v. Caldwell, supra note 1, at 174; Vorenberg v. Bunnell, supra
note 2; Ludgate v. Somerville, supra note 4.
5 Cases supra note 54, particularly Ludgate v. Somerville. Compare
Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473, 26 Sup. Ct. 127 (1905).
56 Minkus v. Pond, supra note 1.
57 Forstmann v. Joray Holding Co., supra note 3.
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to force the removal of a business block erected in violation of
the covenants. The immediate neighborhood had completely
changed to a business section and had been zoned for commercial
purposes. The plaintiff had negligently delayed in bringing suit
and the restrictions in the deeds had but three years to run.
Relief was refused. In other words, as the Massachusetts court
said,5' "The question, whether equity will specifically enforce
such restrictions, is (as before the passage of that statute) a
matter for the exercise of sound equitable discretion in the light
of all attendant circumstances." The zoning ordinance with its
provision for a broader use than that permitted by the restrictive
covenant is not treated as one of the circumstances. Cases will
arise, however, where the conditions that brought forth that
ordinance, as well as those likely to result from its effects, will
constitute important factors.
Then take the situation where the lot in question was conveyed
upon the condition that it be used only for a purpose now pro-
hibited by the zoning law, with provision in the deed for a
reversion to the grantor if the use originally contemplated ceases.
iM[uch will depend upon the exact language of the instrument, the
precise lay of the land in the immediate vicinity and the extent
to which the court sympathizes with the need for the zoning
classification of that locality. If the plot, at the time of the
ordinance's enactment, was already being actively used as
required by the deed, and that does not amount to a nuisance,
the ordinance would probably be without effect. If, on the other
hand, the use specified in the conveyance had not begun, and
this fact of itself would not work a forfeiture, the lot-owner's
predicament might be ground for a variance by the board of
appeals. For, unless the conception of hardship, which induced
the New York court 51 to refuse a vendor specific performance
against a vendee after a supervening zoning ordinance had made
illegal the purpose for which the latter agreed to buy the land,
would operate here as a basis for recovery of the purchase price,
and that is unlikely, the ordinance confiscates his investment.
But the community is not interested in who owns the lot, so long
as the zoning classification is adhered to. The grantee got just
what he paid for, a defeasible fee. Ordinarily, the ordinance
could not be construed as cutting off the grantor's privilege of
reversion. If so intended, there is authority for the view that
5s Vorenberg v. Bunnell, supra note 2, at 887. Compare Note (1918) 31
HARV. L. REV. 876.
59 Anderson v. Steinway & Sons, 178 App. Div. 507, 165 N. Y. Supp. 0(1st Dept. 1917), aff'd 221 N. Y. 639, 117 N. E. 575 (1917). See Notes(1918) 18 COL. L. REv. 162 and (1923) 23 COL. L. Rl v. 060. Compare 3
WILISoN, op. cit. supra note 29, § 1938; WOODWAnD, QUASI-CoaNMXCr




the zoning law would be invalid as impairing the obligation of a
contract.60 On the surface, there is no conflict between the deed
restrictions. and the zoning scheme; yet, practically, the
ordinance precipitates either a deprivation of the lot-owner's
property or a destruction of the reversion.
The fairest way to deal with such a problem, and with all
restrictions found to be obstructive of a zoning plan, is through
the exercise of the power of eminent domain. The court should
cut off the conflicting interests upon payment of compensation.
The condemnation of land for a public building,"' or other tradi-
tional sort of "public use," may frequently involve such a proce-
dure. Courts of equity which, after a "balancing of injuries," or
because of the effects of changesi in surroundings, award sub-
stantial damages in lieu of an injunction, actually do what
"amounts to a condemnation of the servitude without legislative
authority and for a private rather than a public use." 0' A
statutory authorization, however, for just such a process was
held unconstitutional in Massachusetts 03 on the grounds just
quoted. England and Ontario,0 4 on the other hand, have recently
gone far with legislation granting to a court 05 or an arbitration
committee I a discretionary power to modify or discharge
obstructive restrictions in deeds, upon the payment by the appli-
cant of any net damage resulting. Decisions in Minnesota "1
and Missouri 6 perhaps point toward a sufficiently enlightened
concept of what makes for a "public use" in this day and
age to warrant the validity of such a program in this country,
at least to the extent that the modification or discharge is
definitely tied up with the objectives of an otherwise proper
00 Board of Education v. Littrell, 173 Ky. 78, 190 S. W. 465 (1917).
Compare State v. New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923); Dart v.
City of Gulfport, supra note 41.
G Peters v. Buckner, 288 Mo. 618, 232 S. W. 1024 (1921); 1 NI0nOLS,
EItINENT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1917) § 121, n. 52.
62 Note (1918) 31 HAav. L. REv. 876, 878.
031iverbank Improvement Co. v. Chadwick, 228 Mass. 242, 117 N. E,
244 (1917), commented upon in Note (1918) 31 HARv. L. REV. 876.
04 See Note (1927) 5 CAN. B. Rnv. 427; Ontario Stat. 1922, c. 53.
r5 HOUSING, TOWN PLANNING ACT, 1919, § 27, 20 CrnTTY'S STATUTES
(6th ed. 1921) 197; Johnston v. Maconochie [1921] 1 K. B. 239.
66 LAW OF PROPERTY ACT, 1925, § 84, 23 CHiTTY's STATUTES (6th ed. 1925)
288. The administrative regulations and rules are printed in (1926) 70
SOL. JOUR. 1183, 1203. The Act is construed liberally in Feilden v. Byrne
[1926] Ch. 620.
67 State v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174 N. W. 885, 176 N. W. 159 (1920),
approved (by reference to the statute without mention of the case) in
American Wood Prod. Co. v. Minneapolis, supra note 16.
68 Kansas City v. Liebi, 298 Mo. 569, 252 S. W. 404 (1923).
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zoning plan,-' and the compensation is payable from assessments
levied upon the district most directly benefited.
Perhaps enough has been said to indicate that the problems
arising from the relations between zoning ordinances and restric-
tions in deeds will never be solved by the adoption of the attitude
voiced by the counsel for the New York zoning committee:
"No private restrictions need ever refer to zoning, nor need
any zoning ordinance ever refer to private restrictions. They are
entirely separate and apart. Courts will not usually listen to
the private restrictions in trying a zoning case, nor to the zoning
regulations in trying a private restrictions case. They go hand
and hand with each other and never conflict." 70
63 The author of the comment upon the Riverbank case, sz'pra note 63,
probably had this in mind when he said, at 879: "Moreover, if the tract
in question was needed for business purposes for the proper development
of the city and the restrictions resulted in the tract remaining vacant and
useless, a statute permitting registration of title free of the restrictions
upon compensation in order to permit the only practicable use of the land
and thus make it available for the general good might be sustaincd."
Citing Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361 (1905); Stricley v. Mining Co.,
200 U. S. 527 (1906); but see Salisbury Land Co. v. Commonwealth, 215
Mass. 371, 379, 102 N. E. 619 (1913).
70 Discussion by Bassett in PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CITY
PLANNING (1926) 71.
